A friend once reminded me that everything is bigger in Texas.  That appears to apply to church splits, too.  In Mouton v Christian Faith Missionary Baptist Church, Slip. Op. (Tex. Civ. App.-1st Dist., 2016), the Pastor died and a pulpit committee was selected to nominate a successor for a congregational vote to approve or reject.  The pulpit committee nominated the deceased Pastor’s son as the successor Pastor.  However, certain other church officers objected.  They filed the first lawsuit to enjoin the congregational vote on the nomination in 2012.  The trial court dismissed the case.

A congregational meeting was convened and the pulpit committee members and the son of the deceased Pastor were expelled from the church and a new Pastor was elected a month later, seemingly after a nomination by a new pulpit committee and in a second congregational meeting.  The expelled pulpit committee decided to change the signature cards on the church bank accounts to obtain control of the accounts.  But, the current signatory on the accounts would not confirm their authorization to do so.  The bank filed an interpleader action, i.e., the second lawsuit.  The bank account balances were ordered paid into the registry of the court and the trial court dismissed the claims of both groups, the prior pulpit committee and the newer pulpit committee.  The prior pulpit committee also tried to replace church officers by filing a certificate with the secretary of state of Texas.  But, prior such filings had been approved by the Pastor and because there was not one at the time of the filing, the court disregarded it.  The trial court decision was affirmed by the appellate in the first appeal in 2014.

The parties returned to the trial court, without the bank this time, and resumed their cross claims against one another.  The trial court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.  The appellate court again affirmed the trial court.  The appellate court held that merely because the bylaws of the church mandated a pastoral selection process did not did not make the claims of the parties “categorically reviewable by a civil court.”  In other words, the courts of Texas would not select a Pastor and would not decide who was expelled from membership.  Clearly, there had been a congregational vote and as far as the Court seemed concerned, that was the end of it.  That the congregation may or may not have perfectly followed its bylaws by ousting one pulpit committee in favor of another was within the congregation’s prerogatives.  Thus, the new Pastor remained in place and the members on the first pulpit committee remained expelled, and this group recovered the bank account balances from the court registry in the fullness of time.

The flaw in the bylaws that might have contributed to this problem was that the bylaws (as quoted by the court) did not with great clarity specify how a pulpit committee would be selected.  The reality, too, was that the congregation could vote one way and be reconvened to vote another way even a short time later.  One possible consideration is that a church that has lost a Pastor to death, retirement or attrition of any kind may want to consider engaging temporary pastors for as much as a year not only so that a careful pulpit committee search can be conducted, but to allow the congregation to adjust to the idea of a new pastor.

“WELL DOC, IT ALL STARTED WITH A CHURCH BOARD MEETING.”  In secular law briefings I have given before denominational gatherings and conferences for church leaders over the years the first line in all capital letters of this entry is often my opening line.  Most church splits, employment issues, and battles over a Pastor start at the church board meeting.  In the case under discussion, the church board in a congregational church (a church with only local control and no denominational control, other ties notwithstanding) decided not to call a congregational vote when requested to do so by members.  It seemed that the bylaws of the church required a congregational vote when called for by a member or a group of members.  In this case, Hawkins v St. John Missionary Baptist Church, Slip. Op. (Cal. Civ. App. 2017), the vote demanded was a congregational vote to keep or remove the Pastor.

The member or group of members not given a congregational vote sued to enforce the bylaws.  The trial court held that enforcing the bylaws was not ecclesiastical and therefore not shielded from court review.  The trial court appointed a referee to conduct a congregational meeting and the vote.  The first problem the referee had to solve was to identify the members.  After that determination, then it had to be determined whether each member was an eligible voter.  The church (acting through the board) developed a membership list for the referee but omitted three members by mistake.  But, the referee would not allow the error to be corrected.  The three omitted members’ votes were sealed in an envelope by the referee.  The referee, the church board, the group challenging the Pastor, and the trial court did not know how the three voted.  (However, it seems likely that both sides knew the three members well enough to forecast their votes.  The board was seeking the counting of the three votes and the challengers were seeking to enforce the referee’s ruling excluding them.)  Without counting the votes of the three disqualified members, the referee held that the votes cast were 264 votes to retain the Pastor and 265 votes to terminate him.  The trial court accepted the referee’s ruling.

The appellate court reversed the trial court decision, and thus the referee’s, and ordered the three votes counted.  (This seems to have put the board and the Pastor on top.)  The court held that the grounds for rejecting the correction of the membership list, Robert’s Rules of Order, did not apply because the votes’ impact on the plebiscite were unknown and Robert’s Rules only prohibited such a change if the impact on the final tally was known in advance.  The court did not reach the question about a fourth voter:  a woman that was an ineligible minor when the list was created by the church board but was eighteen at the time of the vote and eligible.  She had been deemed ineligible by the referee.  Because her vote would not change the outcome either way, the court did not reach it.

Implicit in the rulings of the trial court and the appellate court was an unspoken criticism of the church board for not calling the requested meeting as required by the bylaws.  Also, the appellate court asked the church to amend its bylaws to avoid future problems by specifying what was meant in the bylaws by “good standing.”  In addition to the four members discussed above, seven additional members were deemed ineligible to vote on “good standing” grounds.  The referee would have benefited from an up to date membership list that had been carefully checked.  It is unlikely the referee knew, but the court might have, just how difficult up to date membership records are for churches to maintain.  For example, if the bylaws state the person is not eligible to vote if they have not attended in a year, what is the record that provides the date of last attendance?  If the bylaws put the power to unilaterally make an eligibility determination in the church board, is there a limit on when the board can change the determination?  Of course, bylaws are not needed until they are needed, so there is tendency not to review them periodically.  Annual review seems to make the most sense.

In most cases, the prohibition of court involvement in internal church issues is good for the court and good for the church.  That is the fundamental motive behind the 1^st Amendment spawned ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.  However, because generally courts default to deciding controversies brought before them, even the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine will usually give way to an internal church battle that “spills out into the street.”  A court will often intervene until order is restored.

In Church of God in Christ, Inc. v L.M. Haley Ministries, Inc., Slip. Op. (Tenn. App. 2016), the trial court dismissed the case and the court of appeals affirmed.  The Church of God in Christ, Inc. was held to be a hierarchical or connectional denomination and the affiliated church in question was held to be one of its affiliated churches.  The founding Pastor of the church died and the presiding bishop installed a “speaker – rotation” system to prevent “dissension among those vying” to become the new Pastor.  But, two years later the presiding bishop died and a new bishop was appointed.  The new bishop had the authority to appoint a new Pastor and appointed himself.

But, when the new bishop in the role as the new Pastor tried to assume control of the church assets he was threatened and blocked by local church members.  The opinion does not explain why this occurred.  The denomination filed a lawsuit to regain control of the church property.  Some of the local church members tried to initiate the process to depart from the denomination but did not complete the process and the denomination excommunicated some of the members.  However, because the church had not withdrawn from the denomination, and the denomination had not declared the church withdrawn (or excommunicated), the courts determined the dispute was internal and further court intervention was barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.  The court would not declare the denomination’s rights to the assets of the affiliated church and the court would not confirm the new bishop as the new Pastor pursuant to the denomination’s governing documents.

The lesson that seems to emerge is that denominational authority over assets or personnel can only be enforced by a court if the denomination decisively separates the local church as a rogue (or, though not applicable in this case, separates from the rogue Pastor) consistent with the denomination’s governing documents.  The courts will not settle mere squabbles between personalities.  The courts will not settle down unruly members.

Things got so heated that the court issued several injunctions in favor of the Church terminating the Pastor, reinstating certain members that had been removed, readmitting certain church members that had been expelled, and prohibiting certain members from various activities, including later, a 500 foot non-entry zone around the church for those members and the former Pastor.  The trial court seems to have used the church foundational documents to identify election procedures that were mandated by the documents and identify the persons elected to leadership.

At least one prior injunction had been affirmed on appeal in 2013.  Finally, the trial court entered an award of attorney fees to enforce the injunctions.  The second appeal was memorialized in Saints’ Rest Missionary Baptist Church, Inc. v Anderson, Cal. App., Slip. Op. 2016 (unpublished).  The award of attorney fees was affirmed.

For a California court to enter multiple injunctions to enforce or even decide internal church control disputes implies that the “church split” reached extraordinary levels of hostility.  That these injunctions were appealed twice is indicative of a willingness by the losing faction to fund extraordinary legal fees to continue the fight.

Court intervention by injunction in church splits is rare because usually the disputants will, once a court orders or threatens to order the foundational documents of the church or denomination be followed, calm down and allow the process to conclude the dispute.