Tag: church property

THE “BAD MOTIVES” DEFENSE IN THE HIERARCHIAL CHURCH CASE

After a fire destroyed the church building in 2013 and insurance paid $1 million, the denominational authority had to decide whether to rebuild the building. In order to make the decision, the denomination decided to first test whether the congregation was viable. The congregation had stopped paying dues to the denomination, stopped attending synods, and stopped obtaining approval of elected board members of the local church. When the denomination asked the congregation how many dues paying members it had, the congregation could only identify “twenty seven and one half” dues paying members rather than the number required to prove viability, which was fifty. The Plaintiffs sued to try to stop the denomination from ending the existence of their congregation and seizing the church property and accounts. St. Cyrillus v Polish National Catholic Church, Inc., Slip Op. (Superior Court, NJ, 2017).

The St. Cyrillus opinion was issued by a New Jersey trial court in which the court granted summary judgment to the denomination based on the reversionary clause in the denominational documents. (In many states, trial courts do not have staff attorneys and do not write opinions so this opinion represents a rare opportunity.) It was alleged the denomination in correspondence referred to the St. Cyrillus congregation as that “peruvian congregation.” The argument was that the reference to nationality or ethnicity was pejorative. It was argued it showed a “bad motive” by the denomination to reach the decision to close the congregation and gather the assets. The trial court held the mere mention of the congregation by that label did not in isolation indicate the term was used pejoratively. In any event, the court held the congregation could not prove it was viable.

There are not many reversionary clause cases extant. Those that are almost always find the denomination, if the congregation was a member, has the right to exercise the reversionary clause. The St. Cyrillus congregation was an active member of the denomination from 1937 until 2010 and therefore its membership in the denomination was not effectively contestable. The denomination tracked the participation of the congregation in synods over several decades. Correspondence from pastors of the congregation going back forty years demonstrated acknowledgment of membership. The congregation was incorporated before it joined the denomination but that gap in the documents was insufficient to negate the other abundant evidence. The lesson regarding the need for quality denominational documents and document retrieval was well made.

A TALE OF TWO VICARS

In a single church building, two factions formed and irrevocably divided the congregation. One faction was led by a presiding vicar appointed by a metropolitan and the other faction was led by another presiding vicar appointed by a different metropolitan. The metropolitans were from two different nations. The two factions shared the church building for several years while their litigation for ownership proceeded. But, one faction tired of awaiting the judicial outcome and locked out the other. The locked out faction sought an injunction to resume sharing the building and it was granted. An appeal followed. The faction that sought to lock out the other claimed they were changing the locks because their metropolitan ordered that sacraments be offered in the building only once per Sunday. The faction that changed the locks claimed that their action was ecclesiastical because they were obeying an ecclesiastical order. The appellate court affirmed the injunction because it was a preliminary and temporary order meant only to preserve the status quo. St. Mary’s Knanaya Church, Inc. v Abraham, Slip Op., Commonwealth Court PA, 2017.

The Court certainly did not accuse anyone of trying to game the system with an “ecclesiastical” order. Nevertheless, it is hard not to wonder if that was the strategy. It would have been a clever ruse but like most “trick plays” it had no lasting impact on the score. Regardless, the amount of money the competing factions are expending on legal fees to protect their respective ownership rights in the building would likely have comfortably relocated one of the factions.

The primary legal lesson from this opinion might be that a preliminary injunction designed only to preserve the status quo will receive greater tolerance even if it tends to intrude into ecclesiastical matters. Also, because this is at its core a dispute over real estate, neutral principles would allow disposition without consideration of ecclesiastical orders delivered solely to resolve the land dispute.

“I DON’T THINK A CHURCH OF THIS SCOPE WAS ENVISIONED”

West of the Mississippi the word “megachurch” brings to mind a church complex serving thousands of people. Contrast that to Maryland where apparently a “megachurch” is a 31,500-square foot sanctuary building, which would afford seating for 1,000 people, classrooms for religious education, a nursery area, a warming kitchen, offices, parking and a “fellowship hall” which would also serve as a gymnasium all on 16.6 acres. At least, it is a “megachurch” in Maryland if certain evangelical denominations are involved. Such a “megachurch,” in Maryland, may threaten the watershed, threaten the traffic pattern, and otherwise endanger the peace of the neighborhood so zoning laws can be invoked to stop its construction. Little did the Marylanders realize that West of the Mississippi such a church would be at best considered medium in size.

In Hunt Valley Baptist Church, Inc. v Baltimore County, Memorandum Opinion (USDC, D. Maryland, 2017), the Plaintiff outgrew its original location and facilities and bought 16.6 acres that was approved for a housing subdivision but only contained two single family residences. The zoning powers simply stopped the development of the entire 16 acres by the church. The parking lot proposed was too porous, even though it was identical to the parking lot at the church next door. The church building proposed might use a third of the land and threaten the watershed but the golf course next door had no environmental impact. The zoning board was especially afraid of the fellowship hall that might double as a gymnasium even though five other churches in the same zoning tract were approved for such facilities and the zone was automatically by statute open to school construction. Based on such facts, and many others, the Court in its 76 page opinion refused to dismiss the church’s lawsuit brought to enforce its rights provided by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 USC §§2000cc, et. seq. (“RLUPIA”). One board member was quoted in the news media as saying, “I don’t think a church of this scope was envisioned.” The Court noted it in passing but it seemed to explain the inconsistencies in application of the zoning laws. This decision meant only that the church got to proceed to try to prove their allegations.

What seemed clear from the opinion was that the church invested enough in its legal representation to make a viable fight against “city hall.” While the outcome remains to be determined, the opinion is a relatively good blueprint of what a church zoning challenge may entail. Typically, such challenges are factually byzantine because wide discretion is permitted, and the statutes often do not limit the exercise of discretion in a material way, no matter how many elements are in the statute. Also, the record of the reasons for decision available from such proceedings is often very thin. Indeed, in this case before the zoning board, no expert witnesses were engaged by the city to counter the expert witnesses called by the church during seven hearing sessions scheduled during a year. Only in public hearings before the city council were experts for both sides deployed. That means the church hired expert witnesses to testify before the zoning board, before the city council and will have to do so before the court. The costs have been and will be staggering. In federal court, the experts, if they have not already done so, will have to write reports compliant with the federal rules, testify at deposition, and if they survive that gauntlet testify at trial.

CHURCH BUILDING REPAIR AS A SECULAR PURPOSE

Reported in a prior posting on this website was the United States Supreme Court opinion in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). In Comer, Missouri disallowed payment of a grant to a church to install a rubber surface on its otherwise concrete playground. The Supreme Court held that the neutral purpose, safeguarding playing children, was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court went on to point out that excluding an applicant just because the applicant was a religious organization was discriminatory. That decision was relied upon in Taylor v Town of Cabot, 2017 VT 92.

In Taylor, the Supreme Court of Vermont tentatively upheld a municipal vote that approved an award of $10,000 of building repair and restoration funds for repair of an “historic church” building against the Vermont equivalent of an Establishment Clause challenge. The decision was a reversal of a preliminary injunction issued by the trial court before Comer was issued. Thus, the case was returned to the trial court for further proceedings which still could eventually result in a decision against the church and in favor of the tax protestors.

While the decision might seem to be favorable to the church, and the Town of Cabot may have been defending the case, at some point someone may decide this much litigation over $10,000 is simply too much and the church might return the money. Indeed, the Vermont Supreme Court held that if the trial court on remand again decided the award violated the Vermont constitution the money might have to be repatriated by the church. Churches that take governmental money of any kind run such a risk. Historically important church buildings might not be economic to preserve. Nevertheless, just because an applicant for governmental funds is a church by itself should not result in denial as long as the funds have a secular purpose not reasonably related to establishment of worship.