Category: church employment

TERMINATION POWERS

Most churches incorporate and then appoint a board of directors (or a similar board using names deemed biblical, e.g., “deacons,” “elders,”) responsible for conducting church business. Some church governing documents, which may or may not be called a “constitution” or “bylaws,” do not expressly assign to the congregation’s official membership any other power than an annual vote to elect directors to vacancies created by term expiration. The authority to hire or terminate a pastor is often not expressly stated as that of the board or the congregation.

In Vaughn v Faith Bible Church, Slip Op. (MY App, 2020), the church board terminated the pastor. The pastor sued claiming that church board had to defer hiring and termination decisions to congregational meetings. The trial court entered judgment against the pastor and the appellate court affirmed. The governing documents were silent as to who had authority in the church to hire or terminate a pastor. The state statute governing corporations did not provide an exhaustive list of powers delegated to the corporate boards, and did not expressly mention hiring or firing as a power. The courts held that the statutory list of powers placed in the corporate board was not exhaustive so the corporate board would have the power to hire or fire absent a specific delegation in the governing documents.

Because congregational meetings and votes are unwieldy, only small churches tend to rely on congregational meetings or votes to determine most issues, including employment issues. In small churches, every family committed to the church is usually represented on the board in any event. In larger churches, the church board is usually the body responsible for day-to-day operations, including hiring and firing. Church governing documents should spell out which body has the authority to hire or fire a pastor. Other employees should be under the employment authority of the governing board, or the board and pastor, or controversy will plague the lowest staff position turnover. However, if the documents are silent, a church board created by the governing documents will likely have the authority by default.

MORALS CLAUSE SPECIFICITY

Churches and church schools often adopt employment morals clauses. Morals clauses rarely specify the immoral conduct prohibited because the owner or sponsor of the school is a church that has a generally known doctrinal or biblical stance regarding morality. Termination based on alleged violation of a morals clause, especially in mainstream churches and their satellites like church schools, may not always shield the school or the church from liability claims based on employment discrimination statutes.

In Crisitello v St. Theresa School, Slip Op. (NJ App. 2020) (unpublished), the appellate court reversed the summary judgment of the trial court for the second time. The trial court found that being a terminated unwed pregnant female was not actionable. The church school had a morals clause that required the teachers and staff to adhere to the doctrines and morals of the Roman Catholic Church. However, the employment handbook containing the morals clause did not in the clause expressly specify pre-marital sex as prohibited. The plaintiff alleged the school’s termination decision was based only on the knowledge of the pregnancy and the teacher’s unwed status and was discriminatory because there was no inquiry into the premarital sexual actions of other employees, especially males. The teacher was an art teacher and did not teach religious education, distinguishing the claim from those in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. ___, (2020) and Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 591 U.S. ___, (2020). The Establishment Clause, the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine, and the Ministerial Exception, were deemed inapplicable.

Of course, to suggest that the morals clause had to have greater specificity, such as a recital of the Ten Commandments or scripture citations, is itself an ecclesiastical determination. The appellate court seems to have reasoned it is possible a college-educated person might go to work in a Roman Catholic church school and not know the Roman Catholic church has not yet endorsed as acceptable pre-marital sex. While it may be that the teacher in the case reported did not have religious teaching duties, which might prevent application of the Ministerial Exception, it remains to be seen whether determining the scope of a morals clause might not entangle a court in ecclesiastical discussions.

TERMINATION DEFAMATION CLAIMS

In the private secular sector, employers are typically very careful about revealing the reason for termination of an employee except upon service of a subpoena or regulatory order compelling production of the information. But, there is no Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine or Ministerial Exception in the private secular sector so leaked defamatory statements, typically in email, texts, or other digital documents could form the basis for a defamation claim under the right facts.

In Maize v Friendship Community Church, Inc., Slip Op. (Tenn. App., 2020), the pastor was terminated and a group of communications leaked that indicated it was because of an allegedly improper relationship between the pastor and the sound booth operator. The pastor tried to retain control of the church and the sanctuary building but was ultimately locked out. Because a wrongful termination claim was not available, the pastor sued claiming that the leaked information regarding the grounds for termination was untrue and defamatory. The trial court dismissed the case because the termination of a pastor by a church is outside the jurisdiction of the court due to the First Amendment imperatives. The trial court held also that the allegedly leaked reasons for termination were likewise barred from judicial review by the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine. The appellate court affirmed.

Defamation claims are sufficiently problematic that only the wealthy can sustain them to any conclusion, but they are rarely won. In the information drenched society defamatory information may have fifteen minutes of fame and then be forever lost. Most defamatory information in the information age only migrates from one place to another if someone goes looking for it. Nevertheless, churches and parachurch organizations should be circumspect regarding termination communications. Defined precautions as to release of information may also provide a defense in some jurisdictions. Of course, if the defamatory statement is true, there can be no claim, which may explain why there are so few successful defamation cases.

WAGE AND HOUR LAWS AND CHURCHES

Wage and hour laws are generally statutes enacted by states that govern hourly wages, overtime, and other rules. Generally, in addition to the statutes in each state, each state has adopted regulations that further interpret the statutes. Therefore, generalizations about state wage and hour law are problematic. Most states, by statute, regulation or some other means limit the enforcement of wage and hour laws as to church employment. Employees that are “ministerial” are generally not governed by state wage and hour laws. However, determining when an employee is “ministerial” under these state provisions can also be problematic.

In Samano v Temple of Kriya, Slip Op. (ILL. App. 2020), the trial court held that the Plaintiff’s employment was governed by state wage and hour law. The trial court reasoned that the duties of the Plaintiff were more secular than religious. The appellate court reversed. The Plaintiff’s title included her as ministerial staff, she conducted weddings, baptisms, and funerals, even though these were not her primary duties, and she was responsible for disseminating “the spiritual messaging of the defendant temple” to the public. She was responsible for posting religious books, digital versions of sermons, and streaming of yoga as a form of spiritual study. That the defendant charged for some of the materials did not convert all of them from religious to secular. As a result, the regulatory authority’s pronouncements regarding jobs that were considered ministerial could and probably did encompass Plaintiff’s job. The appellate court took guidance from federal decisions exploring the scope of the Ministerial Exception even though the language of state wage and hour laws and regulations were not identical to federal employment laws.

Wage and hour laws will likely be, if the statutory language permits enforcement as to religious entities, enforceable as to clerical and cleaning employees in churches. Whether these statutes will be imposed on the relationship with employees that have secular as well as ministerial duties will remain unclear. Courts that try to determine whether a duty is secular rather than religious will risk entanglement in ecclesiastical issues the First Amendment and the Ministerial Exception were to avoid. Application of the “primary duties” test used in Ministerial Exception cases may further narrow the application of wage and hour laws, too.