Author: churchlitigationupdate

HIERARCHIAL CHURCH TITLES AND TRADEMARKS

For some reason, some in the judicial branch have difficulty refraining from interfering in internal denominational matters when the local church or local diocese tries to escape from the parent organization with the local land holdings, too, rather than simply leaving and starting anew. This seems odd given that these assets are generally amassed by local church members over a period of decades or even centuries that thought they were supporting their denominational church. The new leadership or congregation in the local church may in recent times decide it can no longer as a matter of conscience support the parent church, but that does not automatically relieve them of the duties they may owe the denomination as to church assets accumulated by prior generations of members.

Episcopal Church litigation has focused the judicial microscope on denominational documents, land titles and ecclesiastical process as well as the hesitancy of some in the judicial branch to abstain as noted above. In Protestant Episcopal Church, et al, v The Episcopal Church, ___ SE2d ___, 2017 WL 3274123 (SC 2017) it took four justices each writing separately to reverse the trial court (and there was a dissent). The guiding finding was that the Defendant was the parent church in a hierarchical church and that the Plaintiffs were subordinate church entities. Once this finding was made, the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine required the Court to defer to the ecclesiastical decision-making by the parent church. The Court concluded (quoting) “what happens to the relationship between a local congregation that is part of a hierarchical religious organization when members of the local congregation vote to disassociate is an ecclesiastical matter over which civil courts generally do not have a jurisdiction.” Thus, the denominational requirement that the subordinate church entities held title to local church property in trust for the parent church was enforceable as were the federally registered trademarks. Indeed, one of the concurring opinions suggested the Plaintiffs were “masquerading” as an authorized diocese in an effort to secure their land titles. The autonomic reflex of the Court to switch to “neutral principles of law” regarding trust issues and property title issues was deemed inapplicable given the applicability of the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine and the resulting deference to ecclesiastical due process imposed by the parent church.

The lesson for local churches is to be prepared to buy the property from the parent church or be prepared to leave it behind when disassociating and before announcing the disassociation. With most local churches, the denominational parent will be unable or unwilling to keep the local church property and payoff remaining mortgages and maintenance costs and will negotiate a reasonable and affordable sale of the rights. But, if the parent church decides to play “hardball,” the local church may be forced to relocate.

“DISFELLOWSHIPPING” LEGALITIES

I am not sure “disfellowshipping” is actually a word but I have seen it in various church writings over the years. It seems to be the termination of church membership and exclusion from the church property in the traditions that use it. It seems to be a step down from excommunication which in some traditions at times was thought to be a sure fire damnation. Also, disfellowshipping seems to be used in both a temporary mode and a permanent mode. Whether “disfellowshipping” is a good idea or a bad one depends on the view taken of I Corinthians 5 and other similar passages. That is outside the scope of this blog and this post.

In Campbell v Shiloh Baptist Church, Slip Op. 2017 WL 1434249 (Sup. Conn. 2017), a trial court was confronted with the legal ramifications. The Plaintiff’s church membership had been revoked by a congregational vote in a congregational church (although on this topic it might not have mattered). The Plaintiff sued to enjoin the church from revoking his membership in the church. Interesting, too, was that the church’s Board of Deacons meeting authorizing the congregational meeting and vote on membership revocation was preserved in an audio recording. Also interesting was that the church took the precaution of video recording the congregational meeting at which the expulsion vote was taken. The Plaintiff alleged “procedural irregularities and inequities” in the congregational vote. The audio recording and video recording was not surprising because this was the second time the Court ruled upon Plaintiff’s quest for reinstatement. In the first case, and quoted in this opinion, the Court held its inquiry was limited, “as stated in this court’s earlier decision … a court may inquire whether the act of expulsion was in fact the act of the religious organization.” 63 Conn. L. Rptr. 531. The Court determined the expulsion was the act of the Defendant church and dismissed the Plaintiff’s case. The Court would not undertake “policing of a religious organization’s compliance with its internal procedures.”

This opinion is a reasonable blueprint for the procedure of “disfellowshipping.” Few churches ever have to do this but churches with a reasonable set of bylaws, reasonable leadership, the appropriate mechanism, be it a board or the entire congregation, and reasonable documentation of the vote of either or both will not leave an opening for legal process. In churches where the power is vested in the hierarchy, and the process is settled, the result should be legally impenetrable. For churches where the power is not specified in bylaws, typically congregational churches, the congregational vote is the only mechanism.

REMOVAL AND THE ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

Generally, federal courts can only hear cases in which the Plaintiff is from a state other than the state from which the Defendant hails or if the case involves a federal law. Generally, assuming the parties are from the same state, a federal court will review the state court Petition or Complaint that was removed by the Defendant to federal court to determine if the Petition or Complaint raises a question under federal law. If none is found, the case will be remanded to the state trial court from which it came. The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine and the Ministerial Exception are federal constitutional law doctrines but typically they are raised in a case as defenses by the Defendant. If the state trial court Petition or Complaint only mentions state law, unless there is a federal law lurking in the Petition or Complaint, the federal court will not have jurisdiction and will remand the case to state trial court.

In Savoy v Savoy, Slip Op., 2017 WL 1536158 (D. Nev. 2017), the Plaintiff demanded an accounting from the church corporation under the state law governing corporations. The Plaintiff also alleged that the corporate officers breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation as defined by state law. The Defendant removed the case from state court to federal court based on the Defendants’ defensive assertion of the Ministerial Exception and the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine. But, following normal federal policy, the case was remanded to state court because the Plaintiff and Defendant were residents of the same state and because the Plaintiff did not assert a right under federal law. That the Defendant asserted a right under federal constitutional law was not enough.

The facts of the case are not explicated in the Court’s opinion with sufficient detail to make a guess why removal to federal court was considered by the Defendant a good idea. But, the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine and the Ministerial Exception may be raised in a state court proceeding probably to the same or similar effect. Indeed, state courts sometimes are more reluctant to delve into church splits than federal courts.

CHURCH EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

Generally, an employment contract in writing will be enforced even if one of the contracting parties is a church or para-church organization. “A church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.” Mis v Fairfield College Preparatory School, Slip. Op., 2017 WL 3174422 (Sup. Conn. 2017) (unpublished) (quoting).

The Mis opinion was a trial court order overruling a Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the case continued and the opinion was not the final word. Also, in Connecticut, like most states, obtaining a dismissal is difficult because the factual record has not been developed through any discovery and the Court has only the Plaintiff’s pleading before it which must generally be treated as true regardless of whether it is true unless it is implausible.

In Mis, the Plaintiff was a tenured teacher. The school employment handbook contained a morals clause. For tenured faculty, it also contained a right to a hearing on involuntary termination. The Plaintiff during a school fundraiser was alleged by a church leader to have engaged in immoral conduct, the nature of which was not specified in the Court’s opinion. Upon termination, the teacher demanded the hearing accorded in the handbook. The hearing was conducted and the teacher was exonerated. But, the church terminated the Plaintiff. The opinion of the Court does not explain the reason the church disregarded or overruled the hearing finding, but the Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The Plaintiff alleged the handbook constituted an employment contract.

One lesson of this opinion might be that a church school should not provide a right to a hearing if the church school does not want to be bound by the outcome of the hearing. Also, the whole concept of “tenure” generally acts to create a contract that has to be limited by specific language in the handbook or contract that would fit tenure to the church school circumstance.