Author: churchlitigationupdate

100th Post: ELECTION OF OFFICERS – A NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES ISSUE

Local churches governed by the congregation, even if they are also a member of a denomination, are generally either associations or corporations.  If they are associations, the only governance question is whether there was a vote of the eligible voting members and the result.  Neutral Principles generally allow courts to referee those elections.  Also, incorporated churches typically have bylaws or statutory corporate governance rules to follow.  Neutral Principles generally allow courts to referee those elections.  Once the eligible voting membership casts ballots and a decision is reached, the courts typically fell comfortable enforcing those decision.

In Pule v Macomber, Slip Op. (D. Ha., 2018), the church split spilled into the street and at least one side allegedly enlisted the local police department.  The Plaintiffs alleged they were locked out and threatened with charges of trespassing.  The Plaintiffs allegedly tried to amend the bylaws to extend their two year terms as officers of the church until the litigation was concluded.  A court could probably decide the validity of the amendment under Neutral Principles.  The Plaintiffs alleged that the private citizen defendants conspired with the non-party local police to violate their civil rights.  The claims survived a Motion to Dismiss and the conspiracy claim, even though the police and police agency were not named defendants, was sufficient for federal question jurisdiction in federal court.  How the case may ultimately conclude may still be years in the future.

Generally, if a court will decide which side was elected to office, which can be a messy business as has been seen in other cases reported herein, the prevailing faction’s decisions are implicitly validated.  That decision will turn on the language of the bylaws, the documentation of elections compliant with the bylaws, and the documentation of congregational voting.  One of the decisions generally validated is the hiring or termination of clergy.  Clergy employment decisions are typically out of reach as required by the Ministerial Exception Doctrine.  But, once the officers have been confirmed in office and identity, the employment issue is usually rendered moot.

2018 Begins: UNENFORCEABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

The New Year commenced with a step along the path of the development of the law known as the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine.  Indeed, this development may be an outlier or even a step too far.  Because the development is in an unpublished court opinion, it may be cited only for persuasive effect and is not precedential (aka stare decisis).  Nevertheless, the opinion is from a United States Court of Appeals and those are always significant, especially in the federal district courts that report to that circuit.

In Myhre v Seventh Day Adventist, Slip Op. (11th Cir. 2018), a retired clergyman (assumed so because he was “defrocked”) retired in 2009 and began collecting retirement benefits.  In 2013, an unspecified “theological disagreement” arose.  The opportunity for a retiree to initiate a “theological disagreement” would seem non-existent but to a denominational insider this might seem quite normal.  In addition to being “defrocked” the Plaintiff was excommunicated.  In 2013 the denomination cut off the Plaintiff’s retirement benefits.  The retirement plan document stated eligibility continued only so long as the beneficiary remained a “member of good standing.”  The Plaintiff was no longer such a member after excommunication.  The 11th Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the breach of contract claim because the case would require an inquiry into the meaning of “member of good standing” and the underlying evidence on that subject.  Such an inquiry, the trial court reasoned, would be blocked by the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine.  The 11th Circuit characterized the dispute as “disciplinary procedure” not appropriate for judicial review.

The argument did not seem to be whether the membership clause was a condition to starting benefits.  There did not seem to be a dispute about whether the membership clause requirement was by its own language perpetually applicable after initial eligibility had been determined.  It would seem that a court could under the Neutral Principles Doctrine determine if the membership clause was an ongoing condition precedent to continuing to receive benefits.  If it was (and it may have been but the opinion was a bit terse), application of the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine would make sense.

REVERSION PROVISION MANUVERS

Typically, denominational authorities include in their denominational control documents, or even in the titles of the local churches, reversion provisions that prevent local churches from going rogue or otherwise fleeing with the real property.  These provisions are generally intended to protect the generations of members that contributed to the equity owned by the local church by preventing the current generation of members, or some vocal part, from “strip mining” the local church real estate asset.  Sometimes these provisions provide leverage to the denomination to enforce unpopular ecclesiastical positions.  Rightly or wrongly, the reversion provisions are enforced by secular courts and courts will rarely if ever look to the underlying dispute to deny enforcement.

In Saint James Mission Church v African Methodist Episcopal Church, Slip Op. (La. App. 2017), some of the local church members tried to use an eviction docket to evict the denomination after they were locked out.  The split with the denomination raged through the eviction proceeding, a federal trial court proceeding, a federal appellate court proceeding, and finally the state appellate court proceeding.  It took at least six years.  The legal expense was likely significant.  But, in the end, the federal courts ended up on the side line, the state trial court dismissed the eviction proceeding, and the state appellate court affirmed.  The state appellate court held that the eviction docket had a dedicated purpose and the enabling statutes did not allow the proceeding to be expanded into an “ordinary proceeding.”  Thus, dismissal was appropriate.

The attempt to expand the eviction docket was clever but ultimately, if this is the final round in this war, an expensive failure.  It was a stretch to characterize the denomination as a “lessee.”  Limited purpose court dockets are rigid because otherwise they could not serve the limited purpose that birthed them so the rebelling local church members probably knew this was a long shot.  Knowing that, they funded the effort.  Litigating about litigating is always expensive and never reaches the merits of the dispute.

DENOMINATIONAL AUTHORITY OVER MISSIONS

If the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine and the Ministerial Exception mean anything, at the least they preclude judicial inquiry into denominational management or discipline of its own clergy (regardless of by what title they may be known).  In Melendez v Evangelos Kourounis, Slip Op. (NJ App. Div. 2017) a trial court’s summary judgment was affirmed per curiam.  The clergyman established a mission chapel.  He claimed it was with the bishop’s approval.  The bishop denied that it was an approved mission.  The bishop also issued an encyclical in which the clergyman was barred and local clergy were instructed to advise parishioners not to go to the mission chapel.  The clergyman sued for defamation but without doubt that required inquiry into the scope of denominational authority which is typically ecclesiastically defined.  On that basis the trial court dismissed the case and on that basis the appellative division affirmed.

The denomination appeared to be hierarchical.  However, that might not matter.  If the denomination has given itself the authority to manage and discipline its clergy it is not likely that a court will inquire further, even if the denomination is connectional.