Author: churchlitigationupdate

ENFORCEABLE MARRIAGE CONTRACTS

Article I, Clause I, of the United States Constitution elevated contracts above interference by Congress or the states making contracts as cherished and protected as First Amendment freedoms. Sometimes the contracts at issue arise from religious transactions but if the contracts are sufficiently non-religious in language that Neutral Principles of Law can be applied to enforce them courts may do so.

In Nouri v Dadgar, Slip Op. (Maryland App. 2020), in a consolidated case, two Islamic marriage contracts, known as “Mahrs,” contained a clause, sometimes called a “Sadaq,” that required upon divorce the male spouses to immediately pay $608,000 and $492,750 (the value of gold coins and trips set forth in the “Mahrs”), respectively. The purpose of these marriage contracts was to discourage divorce. The appellate court held the “Mahrs” were not against the public policy of Maryland and objectively determinable terms were enforceable. However, the Court remanded the cases to the trial courts to reconsider whether these particular “Mahrs” met the standards for validity of civil contracts, that because the contracts arose in a “confidential relationship” there had to be a determination that the contract was not tainted by overreaching, unequal bargaining power or other inequities. (This summary may not be doing full justice to this very well-reasoned and documented opinion, which was also an excellent short primer on the subject.)

We reported on a Connecticut court opinion from 2019, Tilsen v Benson, Slip Op., 2019 WL 6329065 (Supp. Ct. Conn., 2019), in a post entitled Church Prenuptial Agreements. In Tilsen, the prenuptial Torah based “ketubah” was not deemed enforceable in a civil court because of the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine. The Torah agreement required interpretation by experts in Torah law. In the Maryland case reported above, the “Mahrs” were held to be Islamic marriage contracts and not pre-nuptial agreements.

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION STATUTORY IMMUNITY

In our last report, the question of whether the federal statutory protections of private employer retirement plans applied to para-church organizations was answered with a clear ruling that the para-church organization qualified under the statutory “religious exemption.” Within days, the same para-church organization, albeit in a different state and therefore a different federal court jurisdiction, qualified under yet another statutory “religious exemption.”

In Boydston v Mercy Hospital Ardmore, Inc., Opinion and Order (WD Okla., 2020), the Sisters of Mercy were yet again determined to qualify under the statutory “religious exemption” found in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (aka “Title VII”), 42 USC §§2000e et seq., and in the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (“OADA”), 25 OS §§1101, et seq. The “religious discrimination and retaliation” claim was dismissed when the Court granted summary judgment on that basis. This Court’s analysis of the religious nature of the Defendant, possibly because of a more detailed factual record due to discovery limited to the religious exemption facts, was more detailed than the 8th Circuit case reported herein in the last post. The Court considered governance documents like bylaws and constitution, declarations by the denominational authority that the Defendant and its religious sponsor were religious entities, and sectarian religious symbols displayed in the medical facility. The Court also concluded that scientific and medical services provided for profit did not necessarily indicate a lack of religious control or motivation. The Court considered the number of nuns serving as members of the board of directors.

The less para-church organizations, regardless of function, are visibly affiliated with their religious roots, the more likely the same result will not be reached. The religious heritage of the para-church organization should be preserved to maintain “religious exemption” immunities no matter that the organization also has a secular identity. A sham will be discovered and should not be attempted.

DOCTRINAL FRAUD CLAIMS

There are none. Once in a while, someone who never read the First Amendment will sue a church or denomination and claim their doctrine is false and presented only to fill offering plates or emotionally enslave.

In Gaddy v Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (D. Utah, 2020), Plaintiff claimed the factual and doctrinal assertions of the church were fraudulent, organized criminal activity, and caused her emotional distress requiring counseling. The federal trial court dismissed the case at the initial pleading stage invoking the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. To avoid that conclusion, Plaintiff argued the fraud lurked in the misrepresentation of historical fact upon which doctrine or belief rested and not the doctrine or belief itself. The trial court held there was no difference.

As long as the First Amendment is read literally and generally applied as read, the freedom to believe and preach will remain unfettered. Churches should be as stalwart in protecting the free speech rights of others as their own. Churches that tacitly approve suppression of the speech of “they” will find that someday soon such churches will become “they,” too. Everybody is protected or nobody is safe.

CHURCH MEMBERSHIP UNDER SECULAR LAW

In many posts we have reported court opinions that resolved disputes by using only the denominational or local church governance documents. However, there may be some disputes that cannot be resolved using Neutral Principles of Law to enforce the governance documents. Membership verification may be one of those.

In Ceglar v Christ’s Harbor Church, Slip Op. (Tex. Civ. App. 2020) the trial court held verifying the 25 plaintiffs were actually church members required ecclesiastical determinations the Court was prohibited, and unwilling, to make. The appellate court affirmed and the case was dismissed. The newly hired pastor was accused of “inappropriate behavior and misconduct” by two female members. A faction of the membership demanded a congregational meeting to determine the pastor’s employment fate, but the church board never convened the meeting. Six months later the lawsuit followed. The membership secretary affirmed the plaintiffs were on the church membership rolls but a church board member testified the plaintiffs were for the most part expunged from the membership rolls after ninety days of non-attendance. The ninety-day rule was not in the governance documents but was put forth as an interpretation of the governance documents membership clause. To resolve whether listing on the membership roll or a ninety-day membership cancellation was dispositive, the Court held, would require an ecclesiastical determination by the Court.

Purging membership rolls every ninety days seems unworkable in a volunteer organization like a church and somewhat contrary to the inclusiveness most churches want to offer. Nevertheless, if that is the “rule,” the purge process should be carried out in a disciplined manner. Annual membership roll “clean up” is the preferred practice so that the qualified voters in congregational meetings can be identified and counted. The court was completely silent on whether the church board investigated or whether the allegations against the pastor were determined “not credible.”